A Box of Sand
‘Tripoli is nothing more than an immense
and valueless box of sand.’
GAETANO SALVEMINI, AUGUST 1911.
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A Box of Sand
© Charles Stephenson
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This book is dedicated to the
Axons: David, Tracey, Isabel
and William.
The Author
Charles Stephenson is a naval and military historian and is the author of several books including The Admiral’s Secret Weapon: Lord Dundonald and the Origins of Chemical Warfare (2006), Germany’s Asia-Pacific Empire: Colonialism and Naval Policy, 1885-1914 (2009), and (as Consultant Editor) Castles: A Global History of Fortified Structures: Ancient, Medieval & Modern (2011). He is also responsible for the two works that (thus far) comprise ‘The Samson Plews Collection’; The Face of OO (2013) and The Niagara Device (2015). He lives in Flintshire, North Wales.
CONTENTS
Introduction
Chapter One
The Sick Man
Chapter Two
Making Italy and making Italians
Chapter Three
The Donkey and the Minaret
Chapter Four
Adriatic Veto
Chapter Five
The Italian’s Land
Chapter Six
The Battle of Tripoli
Chapter Seven
‘The Jaws of the Sahara’
Chapter Eight
The Italians Advance
Chapter Nine
Deadlock
Chapter Ten
‘Nations have no friends, they only have interests’
Chapter Eleven
Navalism
Chapter Twelve
The Southern Sporades, the Dardanelles, and the Limits of Navalism
Chapter Thirteen
The Iron Dice Roll
Chapter Fourteen
Peace?
Chapter Fifteen
Retrospect: The Italian Army and the Politicians 1911-1912
Appendix A
Ultimatum from Italy to Turkey regarding Tripoli. 28 September 1911
Appendix B
The Curious Case of Osman Mahdi
Appendix C
The Italian Campaign and the Principles of War
Chapter Notes
Sources and Bibliography
INTRODUCTION
ON 29 September 1911 Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire and proceeded to attempt the conquest of that Empire’s North African vilayet, or province, of Tripoli (now Libya). The resultant conflict, dubbed variously, by English writers, as the Italo-Turkish, the Turco-Italian or the Tripolitan War, was to Italians the Guerra di Libia (The Libyan War) and has come to be called in Turkish Trablusgarp Sava ı (The War of Tripoli) or Osmanlı- talyan Harbi (Ottoman-Italian War).
The recently unified (1861) Kingdom of Italy sought, on the fiftieth anniversary of its founding, to conquer this largely barren territory for purely jingoistic purposes. Italy was a state on the rise with pretensions to Great Power status, and already the possessor of a small empire in East Africa. Conversely, the Ottoman Empire was a state in decline that had been losing territories to other powers, not all of them deemed Great, for a long period of time. This steady loss of Ottoman territory led to the advent of the ‘Eastern Question,’ which concerned itself mainly with the matter of what might, or should, happen to the Ottoman Balkan territories if and when the Empire disintegrated? Should this occur then the potential for conflict between, in particular, the Great Powers of Austria-Hungary and Russia was extremely high. The ‘Question,’ at bottom, revolved around managing Ottoman decline in such a way as to obviate that potential.1
The Great Powers were, by 1911, divided, both formally and informally and with much equivocation, into two blocs; the Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy, and the Triple Entente consisting of Britain, France and Russia. Italy though was, as Richard Bosworth phrased it in the title of one of his books, the ‘Least of the Great Powers’ and was also regarded, by allies and potential enemies alike, as somewhat lukewarm in its adherence to the Triple Alliance.
Because none of the Great Powers desired any great upset in the equilibrium that their alliance system precariously maintained, the Italian decision to go to war against the Ottoman Empire created a situation of great diplomatic delicacy. They had to try to find a middle way that neither encouraged nor discouraged Italian ambitions for fear of driving them into the arms of the opposing bloc. On the other hand, and with the Eastern Question very much in mind, a somewhat similar policy towards the Ottomans was also necessary. Thus one of the most important effects of the Italo-Ottoman War was upon European Great Power politics.
It was an unusual war in other respects too, inasmuch as in order to conduct it at all Italy had to confine its military and naval activities to areas where they would neither cause a widening of the conflict, nor conflict with the interests of the Great Powers. This led to most of the fighting being restricted to North Africa, though it did widen as time went on to much international concern. This occurred because the fighting in the Tripoli vilayet became, as it would be today termed, asymmetrical in character when the Ottoman military were forced to resort to a guerrilla strategy. Due to the nature of the terrain, and the training and capabilities of the Italian military, this led to tactical and operational deadlock and the subsequent paralysis of Italian strategy. Basically put, the invaders were largely compelled to remain within their coastal enclaves, protected by extensive field works and covered by the guns of their fleet.
The defenders, Ottoman regulars and their Arab and Berber co-fighters, were not equipped to assault such works, and the strategy of the Ottoman commanders was, by default, mainly based around attempting to lure the Italians out so that they could be attacked in the desert.
Consequently, the Italians were forced into attempts to bring the Ottoman Empire to terms by applying pressure in other areas, thus bringing them into potential conflict with the Great Powers. It was then no easy war for either the Italian military, or the Italian Government, to wage with any seeming degree of success, and what was foreseen as a short and victorious war of easy conquest turned into a protracted and bitter conflict that endured for just over a year.
This book is the story of that conflict, which has be
en almost forgotten given the events that followed it in short order, particularly the First World, or Great, War. Indeed, though there are several works in Italian and Turkish in print that cover the subject, there is nothing in English that deals with it either holistically or in any great depth. This work is an effort to remedy this deficiency, and indeed the conflict has many interesting facets, not least the introduction of aircraft into combat situations for the first time and the deployment of armoured vehicles similarly. It was a war where one side, Italy, held and maintained naval supremacy, though the existence of an Ottoman ‘fleet in being’ exercised the Regia Marina to the extent that attempts were made to penetrate the Dardanelles and sink it. The difficulties encountered in so doing were lessons that other navies might have studied with profit.
It was also a campaign that was generally considered to have done nothing to bolster Italian military prestige. This judgement is however rather unfair, inasmuch as the Italian Army did what the politicians asked of it, and no army could have done much more given the state of technology at the time. It was, as has been stated, a war fought for jingoistic or social-imperialistic purposes and was in any event totally unnecessary. The Italian government, or more precisely Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti and Foreign Minister Marquis Antonio di San Giuliano, could have had virtually all they wanted without going to war, but needed a smashing victory in order to placate the ascendant nationalist right-wing politicians and newspapers whose prisoners they had become. The conflict turned out very differently however, and whilst retrospectively it seems incredible that any sensible government would embark on a military venture with so much wishful thinking as to the likely reaction and outcome, it is perhaps the case that they were not so uncommon after all. Recent history teaches us that at least.
This book then attempts to set out the background to the Italo-Ottoman War of 1911-1912, and then follows its course until peace came about with the Treaty of Ouchy (or First Treaty of Lausanne) on 18 October 1912. Those with knowledge of the history of the period will note that the month of the signing coincided with the outbreak of the First Balkan War between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Federation. The question of cause and effect between this war and the conflict with Italy will be considered, but also reflected on are the implications of the Italian invasion for the peoples of what was to become, as an Italian colony, officially entitled Libya in 1934. These paid the highest price of all, until freed from Italian rule during the Second World War. The text proceeds more or less chronologically, though those who are interested only in following the military and intertwined diplomatic course of the Italo-Ottoman conflict, and who are not interested for whatever reason in the historical and political contexts within which it took place, should probably skip the first two or three chapters.
Though I have been careful in correctly attributing the sources upon which the work is based, I have attempted to aim it at the general, rather than the academic, reader. There are no ‘theories’ of history to be found within, nor any startling conclusions. It is, or attempts to be, a narrative history which encompasses several perspectives with all the hazards inherent in such an approach. A large proportion of the sources are Italian, particularly for the operational history of the military and naval forces involved, but whilst these are generally accurate in terms of dates and units involved, they are extremely partial in interpreting, or admitting, successes and failures. I have also used a great deal of eyewitness account as there were many war-correspondents present on both sides. These tended in the main however to be extremely partisan in their reporting, dependent upon which side they were with. Nonetheless, they have been extremely valuable, if not exactly neutral, in providing some much needed colour to the tale. Accounts from those participating directly on the Ottoman side are much rarer, though I have used generous excerpts from Enver Pasa’s diary, Um Tripolis, published in 1918. This is, I believe, the first English language work that has used this source to any extent, or at least since Askew in 1942. For the Arab and Berber side of the war I have used Angelo Del Boca’s translations of the writings of Mohamed Fekini and others. A full bibliography is provided and, in any event, all translations into English from whatever language are my work, and any errors thus mine alone. The same applies to the work in general, though I would like to acknowledge the generous help given me by Charles Blackwood, who very kindly drew the maps that accompany the text, and Michael Perratt, who provided the ultimate test for a work of this kind; is it intelligible and accessible to the intelligent lay-reader. Happily he thought so. I am also most grateful to Shaun Barrington for his generous efforts on my behalf, for commenting on the text, and for coming up with the title.
A word or two needs to be said about the rendering of names into English. Although, strictly speaking, the state of Turkey did not come into being until after the First World War many writers used, and still use, the word synonymously with the Ottoman Empire, as well as dubbing most Ottoman citizens as Turks. I have tried to stick with the correct form, but have not altered any quotations to that effect. The same applies to Libya, which only officially came into being in Italian usage in the 1930s. The whole territory invaded by Italy in 1911 was properly called Tripoli, as was the main city there. I have tried to keep to the proper usage, whilst simultaneously attempting to avoid confusing the province and the city. Hopefully I have succeeded. The names of many of the places within the Tripoli theatre, and indeed elsewhere, are also a source of difficulty and potential confusion. I have generally stuck with what seemed to me the most sensible version; though mention some of the other possibilities in brackets on the first occasion I do so. This seemed to me to be the optimum solution, though of course it risks offending some. If you are one of them, then please accept my apologies.
Charles Stephenson
August 2014
1. For an examination of the ‘question’ see: Matthew Smith Anderson, The Eastern question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations (London; Macmillan, 1966).
CHAPTER ONE
The Sick Man
‘Nous avons sur les bras un homme malade – un homme gravement malade…’
[We have on our hands a sick man – a very sick man]
Czar Nicholas I referring to the Ottoman Empire during conversations (the ‘Seymour Conversations’) with Sir George Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador to St Petersburg on 9, 14 and 20 January 1853.1
‘We have cured the sick man.’
Enver Pasa, commenting on the CUP-driven overthrow of the Ottoman government, from Koprulu (Veles) in the Kosovo vilayet (now Macedonia) on 23 July 1908.2
IN 1911 Europe was divided, formally and informally and with some wriggle room as it would be termed today, into two Great Power blocs; the Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy, and the Triple Entente consisting of Britain, France and Russia. Three of these Great Powers, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia, were basically intra-European Empires – though Germany had extensive territories in Africa and the Pacific - whilst the others had extra-European Empires. The largest of these was the British, closely followed by the French. Italy, the least of the Great Powers, had very little empire at all.
There was one other power that, if not included amongst those deemed Great, was nevertheless of vital importance in terms of the relationships between the two blocs; the Ottoman Empire, often, if strictly incorrectly, referred to as Turkey. This importance may perhaps be expressed in the term the ‘Eastern Question,’ which mainly concerned itself with the matter of what might, or should, happen to the Ottoman’s Balkan territories if and when the Empire disintegrated?3 That the Ottoman Empire was in a state of decay, and had been characterized from before the Crimean War as being akin to a ‘sick man’ in danger of imminent death, was a proposition accepted by the Great Powers.4 This decline had been gradual and had taken place against a high point probably reached during the 16th century. It has been argued that, between 1526 and 1596, there was no question of international politics with
which it was not involved. In other words it was a world power at a period when those territories that bound the Mediterranean formed a significant portion of the world. During the early period of the reign of Sultan Suleiman I, who ruled from 1520-1566 and whose appellations included the ‘Magnificent’ and the ‘Lawgiver’, great advances in Ottoman power had been made. These included the conquest of Rhodes, the capture of Buda in 1529 (though the same year also saw defeat at Vienna) and the annexation of Hungary in 1541. These successes however were the high points of Ottoman expansion and despite the conquest of Cyprus in 1570-71 – the last great military success – the years 1565 and 1566 marked the beginning of a halt in Ottoman advances, and thus the start of a decline, albeit a very slow one, in the fortunes of the Empire.
Ottoman expansion and conquest into the Balkan region had resulted in a complex mosaic of ethnic, national, and religious rivalries in that region. The dynamics of this might be exemplified by considering the history of the city of Belgrade, which is situated at the confluence of the Sava and Danube rivers and therefore in a position of immense strategic importance. Following the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Sultan Mehmed II advanced northward, unsuccessfully besieging Belgrade in 1456. Some 65 years later, in 1521, an Ottoman force reckoned to be some 250,000 strong under Sultan Suleiman I marched on the city and this time succeeded in taking it before moving on into Central Europe. It was not until the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat at Vienna in 1688 that Belgrade again became a focus of battle, being conquered by the forces of the Holy League towards the end of that year. The Ottomans returned two years later, taking the city again on 14 October 1690 after a six-day siege. Prince Eugene of Savoy though, in a brilliant military action, retook it in 1717. However, by the Treaty (sometimes called the Peace) of Belgrade in 1739, Austria returned the fortress to the Ottomans and accepted the Danube-Sava River as delineating the common frontier. During the Austro-Turkish War of 1787–1791, Belgrade changed hands yet again, in 1789, but under the 1791 Treaty of Sistova which ended the conflict the Ottoman Empire once again took possession. Serbia won a degree of autonomy from the Ottoman Empire following the two uprisings comprising the Serbian Revolution (1804-1817) and Belgrade became its capital.