A Box of Sand Read online

  If the military gaps could not be immediately filled, the same did not apply, or at least not to the same degree, in the civil sphere; Rear-Admiral Borea Ricci was appointed provisional governor. His deputy was Hassuna Qaramanli (Karamanli) who had occupied the position of mayor of Tripoli under the Ottomans. It may be recalled that San Giuliano had, in his memorandum of 28 July 1911, explored the possibility of using ‘the dynasty of the Qaramanli’ as a fig-leaf for Italian rule. Hassuna was indeed a member of that dynasty, being a descendant of Yusuf Pasa Qaramanli who had been deposed as ruler of Tripoli in 1835. He was in the pay of the Italian government to the tune of 4000 lira per month.19

  That there was little or no disorder, and that the small force of marines was not overmuch troubled by attacks from the desert (there were several skirmishes) suggests two things. Firstly, that there was at that time little resistance to Italian occupation in the small area occupied, and, secondly, that the Ottoman forces were neither sure of the numbers they would face, nor organised enough, to mount any kind of well planned attack.

  Whilst the 2nd Squadron and the Training Division supported the landing at Tripoli City and continued to help defend its occupiers Aubry and the 1st Squadron had sailed eastward, joining some units of his 2nd Division en route. His target was the Ottoman ‘fleet’; almost the entire operational Ottoman navy, the battleships Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis, together with the cruisers Hamidiye and Medjidieh and ten escorts, were exercising in the eastern Mediterranean during late September. This division-sized command had sailed from Beirut on 28 September and was headed north-west towards the islands of the Dodecanese (Southern Sporades). Not being equipped with wireless telegraphy equipment the vessels remained unaware of the Italian declaration of war, however whilst off Kos (Istankoy) they were hailed by an Ottoman vessel and informed of the situation. They immediately broke off their exercises and headed northwards at maximum speed, avoiding the central Aegean and keeping close in to the Anatolian coast. As the fleet transited the Gulf of Edremit between Lesbos (Midilli) and the mainland on 30 September it caused alarm at the island’s capital Mityleni, being mistaken for an Italian force. However, despite some erroneous reports of fighting a battle en route, the safety of the well-fortified Dardanelles was reached on 1 October and the Ottoman sea-going navy was safe, if rendered impotent. It was perhaps just as well for Anglo-Italian relations that Aubry, despite searching into the northern Aegean, was unable to find his target. It cannot have been unbeknown to him that it contained several British officers on secondment. Headed by Vice-Admiral Hugh Pigot Williams (a Rear Admiral in the Ottoman navy), these constituted the personnel of the 1910-1912 British Naval Mission to the Ottoman Empire. Williams had decided that he and his subordinates would remain onboard after receiving the news of war at Kos, but they went ashore for the duration of hostilities once safety was reached.20 On 4 October, and under exclusively Ottoman command, the fleet ventured out of the Dardanelles and stayed out for 24 hours whilst cruising in the vicinity of the entrance. Following this brief and ineffectual sortie the vessels remained anchored off Istanbul until 16 October.

  His attempt to bring about a naval victory – which would probably have obviated the need to still refer to the ‘shame of Lissa’ as a reason for going to war in 191521 – having failed, Aubry then sailed for Cyrenaica. On 3 October his squadron anchored off Tobruk (Marsa-Tobruk, Tubruq) whilst the destroyer Agordat reconnoitred the harbour. Finding the defences minimal, the rest of the squadron entered the anchorage the following morning. The flagship fired a salvo at the ‘Turkish Fort’, which promptly signalled surrender by hauling down its flag. A landing party of some 500 marines and seamen then went ashore and, virtually unopposed, entered the fortification and raised the Italian flag. It had been a ridiculously easy victory and had gained for Italy the best natural harbour on the Cyrenaican coast, described by the British ethnologist Augustus H Keane in 1895 as ‘a spacious natural haven 34 feet [10.3 metres] deep and two miles [3.3 kilometres] long, sheltered from all except the east winds.’22 The marines were easily able to hold Tobruk, (the Ottoman garrison there had been reckoned to number perhaps 70 men), until elements of the first detachments of the Army Expeditionary Force, a battalion of the 40th Infantry Regiment supported by coastal artillery personnel and engineers, landed there on 10 October.

  Meanwhile, the Ottoman regular forces had undertaken a probing attack at Bumeliana on 8 October and dispatches from Tripoli on 10 October carried accounts of two further attacks at the same location during the night. According to a report which appeared in several papers internationally, including the English Daily Express:

  The Bumeliana fortification was attacked at 2 this morning with the object of cutting the aqueduct furnishing Tripoli with drinking water. The earthworks were held by 250 Italian marines under the command of Major Cagni. After twenty minutes heavy firing the Ottoman troops were repulsed. […] It had been expected that the Turks would attack the city, and the guards had been doubled at the wells […]

  [A second attack] took place at about 3 o’clock, when sixty two men who had left their horses with the rear guard advanced within forty yards of the Bumeliana earthworks. They were obliged to leave a number of wounded on the field. […] Cagni had ordered his force to allow the Turks to advance to within 200 yards. There was absolute silence. When the Ottoman soldiers had deployed their entire line of skirmishers they dashed forward, but were stopped by heavy fire, direct and admirably regulated, which gave an impression of forces much superior to those which were really engaged.

  The Turks were flung back into the sands. For five or six minutes small blue flames from their Mausers were seen, but immediately afterward they fled in disorder behind the dunes. The guns of the Carlo Alberto and Sicilia, which could now be used without danger to the Italians, began to thunder, following up with their missiles the flight of the retreating Turks.23

  The Italians had reconnected the Malta-Tripoli cable, the sole means of communication to the outside world, shortly after taking occupation of Tripoli. They did though enforce a rigorous censorship, so that nothing but information that was approved by them could be despatched. Accordingly, all contemporaneous reports despatched from Tripoli have to be treated with the greatest caution; the very fact that they were sent at all means their contents were officially approved. So whilst some of the details of the skirmish described must be treated with prudence, that there was a fight of some kind is without doubt accurate. Nesat Bey was undoubtedly probing the Italian defences.

  Indeed, the marines had held their Tripoli bridgehead for nearly a week unassisted and it could only be expected that Ottoman attacks would increase; reinforcements were urgently required. However, General Pollio had refused to be rushed. In a ‘Memorandum on the Occupation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica’ dated 19 September 1911, he stated that ‘it is absolutely necessary, not only for the good name of the army but also for the dignity of the Nation, that this expedition to Tripolitania be organised in a perfect manner.’24 Organising such a venture in a perfect manner took time, particularly as he had to maintain sufficient forces to defend Italy’s northern and north-western frontiers with Austria-Hungary and France. He therefore ordered Army mobilisation, calling up the reserves on 27 September, whilst simultaneously drawing units from around the country to form an Expeditionary Force. This consisted of an army corps of 44,408 officers and men under Lieutenant-General Carlo Caneva di Salasco [Table 1 below]. Although the first units had been sent to Tobruk, in response to the potential situation at Tripoli, two regiments were despatched ahead of the main body aboard the fast ocean-going liners, Verona and Europa. Having sailed from Naples the 11th Bersaglieri under the direct command of Caneva, and (less one battalion) the 40th Infantry (forming part of Lieutenant-General Conte Pecori Geraldi’s 1st Infantry Division) disembarked at Tripoli on 11 October. These two regiments were required to reinforce the line for only one day, as, on the morning of 12 October, a fleet of some 18 transports plus escorts an
chored off Tripoli with the rest of the Army Expeditionary Force. With the arrival of Caneva’s main body, the Italians were now secure in Tripoli and Tobruk.

  The Armoured Cruiser Pisa. An excellent view from the starboard quarter of the stern armament on this armoured cruiser. The stern turret contained twin 254 mm (10 inch) guns whilst the wing turret was armed with a pair of 190.5 mm (7.5 inch) weapons. The two 75mm (3 inch) guns, the lower being casemate mounted, are also visible. The Pisa and her sister Amalfi were powerful examples of their type, though saw no ship-to-ship combat due to the Ottoman Navy’s (sensible) refusal to give battle. (George Grantham Bain Collection/Library of Congress)

  Pollio’s instructions from San Giuliano via Spingardi stipulated that the primary aims of the occupation force were twofold; the coastal region was to be occupied and the Ottoman forces were to be neutralised. There was to be no advance into the hinterland and, as the Italians were expecting to be welcomed as liberators, the non-Ottoman population was to be respected.25 Indeed, the army plan for the operation, as tweaked in August 1911, had called for nothing more than had now been accomplished other than ‘a few displays of force at coastal points duly selected as secondary objectives.’ Occupation of the rest of the vilayet ‘by degrees’ was perceived to be achievable by non-military means via ‘appropriate political and administrative action on the part of the new government installed at Tripoli.’26 This ‘new government’ was installed on 13 October when Caneva was named as Governor in succession to Borea Ricci. On the same day the marines were relieved of their military duties and rejoined the fleet.

  The navy then began operations against the secondary objectives. Derna (Darnah) was approached by the armoured cruisers of the 2nd Division under Rear-Admiral Presbitero, escorting transports carrying troops from the 22nd Infantry Regiment, on 15 October. The town, some 200 kilometres west of Tobruk, is located at the eastern end of the inland Jebel Akhdar mountain range, which rises to some 500 metres and is one of the few regions that are forested. The area receives an annual rainfall of some 400-600 millimetres, meaning it was one of the few fertile portions of the territory the Italians were attempting to conquer. After the Ottoman garrison rebuffed attempts at negotiations, Pisa, Presbitero’s flagship, opened fire against two observably military installations; a barracks and a fort. Probably intended as an object lesson in the futility of resistance, fire continued for some 45 minutes but was not answered. Having ceased fire, Presbitero attempted to send in a boat flying a flag of truce, but this was met with rifle fire from Ottoman forces entrenched around the town. The four armoured cruisers then opened fire on Derna itself, and virtually destroyed it within 30 minutes. Attempts at landing via boat were however thwarted by the heavy sea combined with the fire of Ottoman troops stationed on the beach. Despite heavy shelling from the fleet, these troops could not be dislodged and thus undertaking an opposed amphibious landing was hazardous in the extreme. It was perhaps fortunate for the Italian Navy that after a stalemate lasting until 18 October the Ottoman forces abandoned their positions, allowing the landing of some 1,500 men.27

  Whilst the operations against Derna proceeded, the armoured cruisers of the 4th Division, under Rear-Admiral Thaon di Revel, were despatched to carry out a similar mission against Homs (Al Khums, Khoms, Lebda), about 130 kilometres east of Tripoli. Aboard the transports were the 8th Bersaglieri Regiment and a field artillery battery, but a landing was found impossible to carry out on 16 October due, as at Derna, to the heavy sea and entrenched opposition. The defenders were estimated to number some 500 regulars with around 1,000 irregulars. The 4th Division conducted a long bombardment of the Ottoman positions, but it was not until 21 October that, the defenders having withdrawn, a difficult landing, during which two boatloads of soldiers were capsized, was completed.

  If Derna and Homs were taken and occupied relatively easily then the overlapping operation at Benghazi contrasted somewhat. There the Italian force had to carry out that most hazardous of manoeuvres; an opposed amphibious landing. The operation was undertaken by marines supported by elements of the 2nd Division of the Army Expeditionary Force. Though Briccola, as divisional chief, was in ultimate command, the force that was designated to undertake the operation was the 4th Brigade under Major-General Giovanni Ameglio, who had with him the 4th Regiment and two battalions from the 63rd Regiment. They were convoyed from Tripoli in eight transports under escort from Aubry’s 1st Division, arriving on the morning of 18 October. Although Benghazi was the second largest town in the vilayet, its population was estimated to be only around 5,000, it being a small trading post for the trans-Sahara caravan trade and an outpost for the Ottoman military.28 The permanent defences were minimal, consisting of a 16th century Ottoman fort, but there were a number of troops there, estimated at between 400-1,000 regulars and 2,500-3,000 irregulars equipped with about twelve field artillery pieces.

  A Bersaglieri officer, Tullio Irace, was despatched with one companion under a flag of truce to demand the surrender of the place.

  Towards noon the Admiral sent me shorewards with one other officer, to deliver to the Mutessarif, or Governor, his ‘ultimatum’ to surrender. Stopping our steam launch just off the Custom-house, we send to request the foreign Consuls to be good enough to meet us in conference […] We present to the Consuls the Admiral’s ‘ultimatum’ already made known to the Mutessarif. Time for decision is granted till 8 o’clock on the following morning: if by that hour the city has not hoisted the white flag or otherwise given proof of its decision to surrender, we should be compelled to have recourse to a forcible landing of troops.29

  No sign of the surrender having been given, the next morning, with the weather being decidedly unpleasant, the Italians began operations. These opened with naval gunfire being directed on four areas: Juliana (Giuliana) beach (‘so called because the daughter of a foreign consul, of that name, had been buried there after an epidemic’30) where it was intended to land the troops, the Berca (Berka) barracks and fortress and nearby Governor’s residence, and a magazine to the north of the town.

  The marines, numbering about 800, landed unopposed at about 08:50 hrs and moved to occupy positions in the dunes behind the beach and, using two 75 mm mountain artillery pieces, established a battery on high ground at Cape Juliana. It seems likely that the descent on Juliana Beach surprised the defenders. Had they foreseen it they could have occupied Cape Juliana and enfiladed the landing ground, even though any such forward defence would have been rendered problematical by naval gunfire. Indeed, a large proportion of the Ottoman force had been stationed to the north of Benghazi, and those south of the town were mainly deployed away from the shore. The latter group’s main position was on the narrow ground between the shallow water and a marsh to the south of it, with a thin line extended from the marsh to the south-west almost to Buscaiba Point. Perhaps realising the initial error of failing to occupy Cape Juliana an attempt was made to capture the Italian battery there and take the high ground. This manoeuvre was though thwarted by naval gunfire.

  The marines managed to secure the beach to the extent that engineers were able to construct piers onto which troops could disembark from the ships’ boats, which, as well as a number of pontoon-floats and lighters, were used to ferry them from the transports. At 10:00 hrs Ameglio led the first of the military contingent ashore and took command of the beachhead. He ordered the marines to advance further inland in order to prevent any interference with the subsequent waves of troops. As they moved between the shallow water and the marsh they came up against the Ottoman position and found themselves unable to advance. However, they were quickly reinforced as more troops landed and were supported by the mountain battery on Cape Juliana. The divisional commander landed at 12:20 hrs and according to his retrospective report of the situation:

  A strong detachment of the 4th Regiment and marines were entrenched, facing south and east, at the south end of the beach on the high ground near Point Buscaiba. Between the salt lake and the beach a mountain battery
was in action, with the main body of the 4th Regiment forming up close by. Between this battery and the higher ground on Point Giuliana were the main body of the marines, detachments of the 4th and 63rd Regiments and the second mountain battery. On the high ground at Point Giuliana were two companies of the 63rd Regiment.31